We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the highest contributors does not increase contributions compared to not recognizing contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. These findings support our conjecture that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige.
Introduction
The desire for social approval is one of the reasons why individuals will act more generously in public if their generosity is viewable by others (Hollander, 1990) . It has been generally acknowledged that recognizing contributors by revealing their identity increases contributions to public goods (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004) . Social groups, charity organizations and online communities publicize individuals' contributions for this reason, and very few contributions are actually done anonymously. Social recognition has also been found effective in disparate settings that include voter turnout and blood donation (Gerber et al., 2008; Lacetera and Macis, 2010) .
While there is agreement among researchers and practitioners that recognizing contributors has a positive effect, the underlying reasons for this effect are less clear. 1 The increase of contributions could be driven by prestige of being recognized as a "high" contributor, or by shame from being recognized as a "low" contributor. Many organizations publicize the names of largest donors to take advantage of prestige -e.g., by naming a building after the highest contributor, or by publicly announcing contributors in categories by size of contribution (Harbaugh, 1998; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Li and Riyanto, 2009 ). Prestige and shame have also been explored in field experiments on voter turnout. For instance, Gerber et al. (2010) found that being reminded that one did not vote in the past (shame) was more effective than being reminded that one did vote (prestige) on voter turnout. Panagopoulos (2010) compared telling potential voters that names of non-voters or voters would be published in a newspaper, and found that publicizing non-voters (shame) had the most pronounced effect. We contribute to this literature through a series of controlled laboratory experiments that systematically investigate 1 One laboratory experiment that does not find a positive effect of recognition is the experiment of Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) . However, as the authors point out, in their setting the reduction of anonymity may come with additional confounding factors.
whether the effect of recognition on public goods contributions is driven by prestige or by shame.
Following Andreoni and Petrie (2004) , we investigate a public goods setting with a baseline treatment in which no identifiable information about participants is displayed and a treatment in which photos and names of participants are displayed. Then we introduce two novel treatments, where only the highest two or only the lowest two (of five) contributors are identified in each period. These treatments allow us to disentangle whether it is the aversion from shame or the anticipation of prestige that causes the observed increase in contributions.
We find that contributions are significantly increased when all contributors are recognized (i.e., photos and names of all contributors are displayed after the contribution stage)
relative to when contributors are not recognized. We also pinpoint which information is most effective at increasing contributions. Recognizing only the highest contributors is not significantly different from not recognizing contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. This finding suggests that it is the fear of shame, rather than the anticipation of prestige, that drives the identification-related increase in contributions in our experiment.
Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures
While the link between the public goods game in the laboratory and social organizations in the field is imperfect, public goods games have been studied extensively to answer questions about charitable giving and contributions to social communities (e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Landry et al., 2006; . In a simple linear public goods game (Groves and Ledyard, 1977) , n identical risk-neutral individuals choose a portion of their endowments e to contribute to a public good. Individual i's contribution c i to the public good is multiplied by m and given to each of n individuals in the group, where 0 < m < 1 and m×n > 1.
The payoff of each individual i is
We employ the linear public goods game to study how visibility of high and low contributors impact individual contributions. To this end, we conducted four treatments, summarized in Table 1 : a baseline treatment in which none of the participants are publicly recognized for their contributions (NONE), a treatment in which all of the participants are recognized for their contributions (ALL), a treatment in which only the participants who contribute the highest (higher than the median) amounts are recognized for their contributions (TOP), and a treatment in which only the participants who contribute the lowest (lower than the median) amounts are recognized for their contributions (BOTTOM).
Similar to the design of Andreoni and Petrie (2004) , we chose to use digital photos to identify individuals to one another. 2 Digital photos capture and preserve the appearance of the person but do not allow for communication, which may confound the effects of identification alone. In addition to the photo, we included first names as part of the identification of individuals. Upon arriving at the lab, each individual wrote his or her first name on a name card, and the experimenter took a photo of the individual holding up the name card. Each individual was then randomly assigned to a computer station in the lab. We used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to record individual decisions and display photos of individuals.
Individuals were assigned to a group of n = 5, and stayed in the same group throughout the entire experiment, playing a public goods game for a total of 20 periods. 3 At the beginning of each period, each individual received an endowment of e = 80 experimental francs and was asked to choose his or her contribution c to the public good. Each individual's contribution to the public good was multiplied by m = 0.4 and the total of all contributions given to each of the 5 individuals in the group. Each individual kept the remainder of the 80-franc endowment that he or she did not allocate to the public good. Individuals did not know others' decisions before making their own decisions. After all individuals made their contributions, the computer displayed the total contribution to the group account and the individual contributions of all 5 group members, sorted by contribution amount from largest to smallest.
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The photos and names of each group member were displayed on the input screen for all individuals, but we varied the display of identifiable information about contributors on the outcome screen across treatments. In the NONE treatment, no additional identifiable information about contributors was revealed (including not revealing/assigning any ID numbers). In the ALL treatment, the names and photos of each member were displayed below his or her contribution, such that each individual was recognized and also "ranked" (see Figure 1 ). In the TOP treatment, the names and photos of only the top two contributors (those ranked #1 and #2) were displayed below their contributions. In the BOTTOM treatment, the names and photos of only the bottom two contributors (those ranked #4 and #5) were displayed below their contributions. Displaying just the top or bottom two contributors allows us to recognize individuals who contributed above and below the median contributor in that period, respectively.
create the most conducive environment wherein our conjectures could be tested. Second, individuals repeatedly participate in social groups and online communities, and thus the fixed matching design better represents these environments. Finally, a fixed matching design gives us an opportunity to investigate group dynamics over periods and to maintain independence among the matched groups. However, one potential drawback of our fixed matching design is that some prestige may come from not being identified as a low contributor in the BOTTOM treatment, and some shame may occur from not being identified as a high contributor in the TOP treatment. It would be interesting to see if our results hold when employing a random matching design (which would have controlled of the latter drawback). 4 While social groups of 5 are rarely observed in practice, the choice of small group allows us to assume that all 5 photos are easily viewed by participants when they are displayed by default (e.g., no time cost to view). lasted approximately 60 minutes. Individuals also completed a demographic questionnaire at the end of each session.
Hypothesis Development
Our goal is to document behavior when display of identifiable information is varied. The standard Nash equilibrium prediction of the linear public goods game is to contribute nothing (free-ride), i.e. c * = 0. However, most experimental studies find that individuals tend to contribute significant amounts (see Ledyard et al, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000) . A common explanation is that, in addition to monetary incentives, individuals have intrinsic motivations.
Behavioral arguments for the intrinsic motivation to contribute positive amounts to public goods include pure altruism, "warm glow" (Andreoni, 1989 (Andreoni, , 1990 , inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) , fairness and efficiency concerns (Rabin, 1993) .
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Revealing individual identities, as in the ALL treatment, may provide an additional incentive for individuals to contribute to the public good. Indeed, several studies find that recognizing contributors by revealing their identities increases contributions to public goods 5 An additional behavioral motivator that has been cited as important is signaling wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996) . (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Soetevent, 2005) . This is usually attributed to the fact that individuals are concerned about their social image (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009) . 6 Therefore, given that in the ALL treatment individual identities are observable while in the NONE treatment individual identities are unobservable, we should expect higher contributions in the ALL treatment.
Hypothesis 1: Recognizing all contributors increases contributions to the public good.
In the TOP and BOTTOM treatments, we compare the effect of identifying only the highest or only the lowest contributors. Identifying top contributors, as in the TOP treatment, may activate prestige or pride (Hollander, 1990; Gilbert, 1998; Harbaugh, 1998) . Pride is a positive emotion that arises when one is approved of or admired by others (Hollander, 1990; Gilbert, 1998) . Harbaugh (1998) refers to prestige as the increase in utility that comes from having the amount of a contribution publicly known. We will use the term 'prestige' to refer to any increase in utility from recognition. We conjecture that individuals in our experiment experience prestige when their contributions are higher than the median and such contributions are recognized. Therefore, given that in the TOP treatment individuals contributing more than the median are recognized while in the NONE treatment individual identities are unobservable, we should expect individuals to increase their contributions in the TOP treatment in order to achieve higher prestige.
Hypothesis 2:
Recognizing the highest contributors increases contributions to the public good due to prestige.
Another argument for why people give is to avoid feeling shame and guilt (Frank, 1988; Ketelaar, 2004) . Shame may arise when an individual has committed a moral transgression, such 6 Several additional theories of the link between social image concerns and prosocial behavior have been advanced. Rege (2004) propose a model that includes "contributor" or "non-contributor" types.
as choosing to free-ride on others' contributions. In the literature, shame is defined as an emotion that induces behavior due to the fear of what others will think, and it is associated with a decrease in utility due to being believed to have acted inadequately (Tangney et al., 1992; Keltner and Buswell, 1996; Tadelis, 2011) . 7 We conjecture that individuals in our experiment experience shame when their contributions are lower than the median and such contributions are recognized. Therefore, given that in the BOTTOM treatment individuals contributing less than the median are recognized while in the NONE treatment individual identities are unobservable, we should expect individuals to increase their contributions in the BOTTOM treatment in order to avoid shame.
Hypothesis 3:
Recognizing the lowest contributors increases contributions to the public good due to shame.
Experiment Results

Overview
We use the results of our experiment to test the hypotheses from the previous section.
The summary statistics of our experiment are reported in Table 2 and the average contributions over all 20 periods are displayed in Figure 2 . Although contributions are declining over time in all treatments, they are higher than the standard theoretical benchmark of zero (c * = 0). These results are consistent with previous studies of public goods games. For example, the results from our baseline NONE treatment indicate that on average contributions are at 29.3% of the endowment over all periods. Andreoni (1988 Andreoni ( , 1995 reported overall contributions at 33.2%, while Croson (1996) reported contributions at 35.7% of the endowment.
The Role of Recognition
When comparing contributions in the NONE treatment to contributions in the ALL treatment, we find that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, recognizing all contributors significantly increases overall contributions relative to the baseline (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test; average individual contribution over 20 periods as one observation, p-value < 0.01; average group contribution over 20 periods as one observation, p-value < 0.05). This finding is consistent with previous findings of Andreoni and Petrie (2004) , Rege and Telle (2004) and Soetevent (2005) .
For example, while Andreoni and Petrie (2004) report average contributions of 48.1% of endowment in their recognition treatment, we find marginally higher contributions of 55.3% of endowment. 8 It is interesting to note that our result is different from the result of Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2013), who find that monetary public goods contributions are not increased by adding a third-party observer. We conjecture that one possible reason for this discrepancy is that recognition is most relevant when one is identified to members of one's own group, rather than to a third party. Our complementary regression analysis reported in Table 3 confirms this result.
The coefficient on ALL is significant both in the tobit random effects model and in the multilevel mixed random effects model. These findings indicate that in our experiment, displaying only the top contributors is not an effective way to increase overall contributions to the public good. for the tobit regression in Table 3 confirms that the coefficient on TOP is significantly different from the coefficient on ALL (p-value < 0.01).
The findings from the TOP treatment may seem surprising given the large literature on prestige and the success of increasing giving through categorizing contributors by size of contribution (Harbaugh, 1998; Li and Riyanto, 2009 ). We suggest that one reason why we do not find a significant effect of prestige is that in our experiment, prestige is relative. That is, one has to give more than three individuals in the group in order to gain prestige. On the other hand, when contributors are categorized by gift amount as in Harbaugh (1998) , prestige is absolute. It is also possible that individuals who give more in the TOP treatment do not want to be viewed as 'suckers', and thus, after being displayed as top contributors, they may want to reduce their subsequent contributions to the public good. In Section 4.3, we provide evidence for this conjecture.
In the BOTTOM treatment, we find that displaying the identities of only the lowest contributors significantly increases contributions relative to both the NONE and TOP treatments Table 3 support these results (coefficient on BOTTOM is significant, pvalue < 0.01; coefficient on BOTTOM = coefficient on ALL, p-value = 0.69; coefficient on TOP = coefficient on ALL, p-value < 0.01).
Result 3:
Recognizing only the lowest contributors increases contributions relative to no recognition, and is not significantly different from recognizing all contributors.
Displaying only the bottom contributors can serve as an exogenous punishment mechanism for low contributors. It has been shown in the literature that social disapproval or sanctioning are powerful mechanisms that improve individual contributions to public goods in anonymous environments (Yamagishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Gaechter, 2000, 2002; Masclet et al., 2003) . Masclet et al. (2003) find that informal sanctions that do not carry a monetary fine are also effective. Therefore, individuals trying to avoid social disapproval and shame should contribute sufficient amounts in order to avoid being the lowest contributors. In Section 4.3, we provide evidence that in the BOTTOM treatment individuals who are seen as low contributors choose to increase their subsequent contributions to the public good.
The finding that contributions in the TOP treatment are not significantly different from contributions in the NONE treatment, but contributions in the BOTTOM treatment are significantly greater than contributions in the NONE treatment, indicates that the effect from identifying contributors is primarily driven by motivators such as avoiding shame from being a low contributor, rather than by motivators such as seeking prestige from being a high contributor.
Dynamics of Contributions
Next, we examine the dynamics of contributions over the duration of the experiment. Table 4 shows the estimation results of regressions separately for each treatment using the generalized method of moments (specifically Arellano-Bond). We find that in all treatments the individual's contribution in the previous period (own-contribution-lag) significantly increases the individual's contribution in the current period. Also, we find that in all treatments, being above the median in the previous period (above-lag) significantly reduces contributions, while being below the median in the previous period (below-lag) significantly increases contributions in the current period. 9 These findings indicate the presence of conditional cooperation, also observed in related work (Fischbacher et al., 2001) . Conditional cooperators tend to cooperate when others in the group do so, and tend not to cooperate when they observe defection.
When examining behavior in individual treatments, we find that being above the median in the TOP treatment is correlated with an expected contribution drop of 17.94, while being below the median is correlated with an expected contribution increase of only 5.29. This is consistent with our earlier conjecture that individuals who give more in the TOP treatment do not want to be viewed as 'suckers', and thus, after being displayed as top contributors, they may want to reduce their subsequent contributions to the public good. On the other hand, we find that being above the median in the BOTTOM treatment is correlated with an expected contribution drop of only 9.74, while being below the median is correlated with an expected contribution increase of 13.72. This is also consistent with our earlier conjecture that individuals trying to avoid social disapproval and shame should increase their contributions in order to avoid being the lowest contributors in the BOTTOM treatment.
Finally, as evidenced by the significant and negative coefficient on period, contributions decline over time. Interestingly, we observe a steeper decline in contributions in the most effective treatment -BOTTOM has both the largest (negative) coefficient on period-trend and the largest initial contribution rate. Despite the declining trend, we still see significant differences in contributions for the ALL and BOTTOM treatments relative to the NONE treatment in the last periods of the experiment. For example, in periods 16-20, we observe 9 Since individual contribution information is viewed in all treatments, individuals would always know whether they are in the top or bottom, and can adjust their behavior accordingly.
average contribution rates of 34% and 29% in the ALL and BOTTOM treatments, and only 15%
and 17% in the NONE and TOP treatments. Using non-parametric tests, the differences between these contribution levels remain significant between the BOTTOM and NONE treatments, and between the ALL and NONE treatments.
Leaders and Laggards
Similar to Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2001) and Andreoni and Petrie (2004) , we investigate the presence of leaders and laggards in our experiment. We use a simple classification system to discover "leaders" and "laggards," where a leader is defined as any individual who contributed 60 or more experimental francs (75% of the endowment) and a laggard is defined as any individual contributed 20 or fewer experimental francs (25% of the endowment) in the first period. 10 The remaining individuals are therefore neither leaders nor laggards. The analysis of behavior in the first period allows us to consider the effect of visibility of contributors independent of the reputation that forms when participating in the game over several periods.
We conjecture that recognizing all contributors (as in the ALL treatment) should increase leaders and decrease laggards relative to no recognition (as in the NONE treatment). In the TOP treatment, leaders are more likely while laggards are less likely to be revealed, so the proportion of leaders should be increased but the proportion of laggards should not change relative to the NONE treatment. In the BOTTOM treatment, leaders are less likely while laggards are more likely to be revealed, so the proportion of leaders should not change while the proportion of laggards should decrease relative to the NONE treatment.
10 Andreoni and Petrie (2004) use a similar approach of classifying leaders who contributed 15 or more tokens out of 20 and as laggards as those who contributed 5 or fewer tokens out of 20. However, the difference is that we use only one set of 20 periods while in Andreoni and Petrie (2004) , individuals complete 5 sequences of contributions with different group members. In that case, they use the measure for "leaders" as those who contributed 15 or more in 4 out of 5 sequences, and as "laggards" as those who contributed 5 or fewer tokens in 4 out of 5 sequences. Table 5 shows the distribution of leaders and laggards as a percentage of total number of individuals. Comparing treatment NONE with ALL, we find that in the ALL treatment there are almost twice as many leaders (52.5% versus 30.0%), and almost four times fewer laggards (10.0% versus 35.0%), and these differences are significant. 11 Leaders contribute an average of 92.5% of their endowment, while laggards contribute an average of 11.6%.
If individuals care about prestige of being displayed as one of the top two contributors, we should expect to see a greater number of leaders in the TOP relative to the NONE treatment.
However, we do not find this in the data. The proportion of leaders in both treatments is the same. 12 Moreover, Figure 3 , which displays the distribution of contributions in all treatments,
indicates that there are almost no differences in distributions between treatments NONE and TOP. This finding further supports our earlier suggestion that prestige is not the primary factor that causes higher contributions from identifying contributors.
13
If individuals are concerned about feeling shame by being displayed as one of the BOTTOM two contributors, we should expect to see a lower number of laggards in the BOTTOM relative to the NONE treatment. This is exactly what our data indicate. There are significantly fewer laggards in the BOTTOM than in the NONE treatment (17.5% versus 35.0%). 14 This finding further supports our conclusion that shame is one of the main factors in 11 A Chi^2 goodness of fit test has a p-value of 0.04 when comparing leaders, and a p-value of 0.01 when comparing laggards. 12 Interestingly, there are more laggards in the TOP treatment even compared to the NONE treatment. This may be because highlighting only the top contributors implicitly emphasizes that the rest of individuals are laggards and thus they should not contribute as much. It is also possible that highlighting only top contributors may implicitly deemphasize the guilt effect, and thus cause more laggards in the TOP treatment relative to the NONE treatment. 13 This finding also may be due to the fact that prestige is relative in this setting, and depends heavily on participants' expectations. If participants do not expect the highest contributors to give over 75% of the endowment, then we may not find a high proportion of leaders. 14 A Chi^2 goodness of fit test has a p-value of 0.08 when comparing laggards.
increasing contributions when participants are identified. 15 It is also interesting to note that there are more leaders in the BOTTOM than in the NONE treatment (42.5% versus 30.0%). 16 It is likely that individuals who are trying to avoid shame are doing so by contributing very substantial amounts, which brings them into the category of leaders. This could be due to the relative nature of being identified as a bottom contributor.
Discussion and Conclusion
We replicate previous literature, finding that recognizing contributors is a very effective way to increase contributions to the public goods. Most importantly, we find that the improvement resulting from recognizing only top contributors relative to not recognizing contributors is marginal and not significant, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors.
What can explain the fact that recognizing the lowest contributors (the BOTTOM treatment) is more effective in increasing contributions to the public goods than recognizing the highest contributors (the TOP treatment)? We conjecture that anticipation of prestige is one of the main motives for contributing in the TOP treatment, while aversion from shame in one of the main motives in the BOTTOM treatment. Given that we found that contributions in the BOTTOM treatment are significantly higher than contributions in the BOTTOM treatment, suggests that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige. A possible explanation for this result is based on the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . According to the prospect theory, loss aversion causes individuals to weigh losses more heavily than gains relative to the reference point. In line with this theory, individuals may be concerned more with avoiding a loss in social image than with seeking a gain in social image relative to the reference point of the median contributor. Given that prestige represents a gain in social image while shame represents a loss in social image, we should expect for shame to be a stronger motivator for giving than prestige. As a consequence, recognizing the lowest contributors should have a greater effect on increasing contributions than recognizing the highest contributors (for which we find evidence).
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Because shame appears to be a powerful motivator to contribute, one may ask the question: why don't social groups, charity organizations and online communities practice displaying only bottom contributors? While these institutions face the problem of increasing contributions, they also face the first-order problem of attracting and retaining contributors.
Given the opportunity of free entry and exit, individuals may simply avoid contributing to communal and charity groups that identify the lowest contributors. 18 Although future work should explore in detail how the possibility of entry and exit affects contributions, our findings may be relevant for increasing socially desirable participation and contribution within organizations or communities when entry and exit is costly or impossible. For example, alumni donations make up a large portion of a university's endowment. One becomes an alumnus through receipt of a diploma from a particular university, and it is fairly difficult to remove oneself from this group due to social ties to fellow alumni. Alumni giving, thus, represents a potential community in which exit is costly. In this case, alumni organizations may choose to 17 The loss aversion argument is also in line with findings in the sanction and reward literature. Sefton et al. (2007) find that monetary rewards by themselves cannot sustain cooperation the way that monetary sanctions can. 18 Related work on monetary sanctions and incentive schemes has similarly identified a preference for bonuses over fines. For example, Sutter et al. (2010) found that while punishment points are more effective than reward points in a public goods game, groups prefer to use reward option when given a choice. In principal-agent settings with financial incentives, the principal prefers to use a bonus contract for the agent, and this is more effective than combining a bonus with a fine (Fehr and Schmidt, 2007) . publish lists of alumni in which both high, low and no gifts are displayed to others. 19 In fact, as a news article recently revealed, senior class gift campaigns at several universities used publicizing non-givers as a tactic to drive over 99% of students to contribute (relative to 50% when using standard approaches). 20 As noted by the news article, the goal of these campaigns is to encourage a habit of giving for the long-term, but the long-term effects of these tactics are less clear.
The findings of our experiment also have practical implications for online communities that rely on user-provided content to be successful. Similar to charity organizations, online communities can increase contributions of effort through publicly acknowledging members. In online communities and forums, contributions usually take the form of user-provided content such as responding to questions on a Question and Answer forum or rating items on the sitethere is a large literature on how to increase contributions online (Ludford et al., 2004; Rafaeli et al., 2004; Rana and Hinze, 2004; Harper et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2008; Zhang and Zhu, 2011) .
For instance, found that social comparisons affect the behavior of users in.
Our study suggests that if participation by all members of an online community is desired, then recognizing all, rather than only top, contributors may be most effective.
The observed effects of inducing prestige and shame through recognition are of general importance. Recognition may play a role in maintaining social norms in diverse settings such as charity contributions, online community participation, team production, health choices and collective action. (7) 526.77*** 700.52*** * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The tobit model is leftcensored at 0 and right-censored at 80.We used Stata 11 for estimation. We estimated the tobit random effects using xttobit and the multilevel random effects model using xtmixed. 
